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Butler v. State: 
COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL DOES 
NOT PRECLUDE 
STATE FROM 
RETRYING 
DEFENDANT ON 
COUNTS UPON 
WHICH JURY 
DEADLOCKED 
AT DEFENDANT'S 
FORMER TRIAL. 
f?ECIENT DIEVlEtOPf1/NENTS 
In an opinion which re-
viewed the intricate doctrines 
of collateral estoppel and dou-
ble jeopardy, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland recently held 
that collateral estoppel does not 
preclude the State from retrying 
a defendant on counts upon 
which the jury deadlocked at his 
former trial. In Butler v. State, 
335 Md. 238, 643 A.2d 389 
(1994), the court of appeals 
ruled that a defendant's acquit-
tal of second degree murder of 
one victim does not specifically 
prohibit the State from retrying 
him on charges relating to as-
sault with intent to murder an-
other victim. 
In an eight-count indict-
ment, defendant Michael Butler 
("Butler") was charged with, 
inter alia, murder and accesso-
ry after the fact in the shooting 
death of Sherman Chenault 
("Chenault") and assault with 
intent to murder Sharre1l 
Hudson ("Hudson"). Witness 
testimony revealed that the at-
tack on Chenault and Hudson 
occurred following the consum-
mation of a failed drug deal and 
that Kent Tilghman 
("Tilghman") was the principal 
in Chenault's murder. 
Butler was tried by a 
jury in the Circuit Court for 
Howard County. The jury re-
turned verdicts of not guilty of 
second degree murder of 
Chenault and guilty of accesso-
ry after the fact to the murder of 
Chenault. However, the jury 
deadlocked on the charges of 
first degree murder of Chenault, 
use of a handgun in the murder 
of Chenault, and four charges 
relating to the attack on Hudson. 
When the State indicated its in-
tention to retry Butler on the 
remaining six charges, Butler 
filed a motion to dismiss, main-
taining that double jeopardy and 
collateral estoppel principles 
precluded such a retrial. Al-
though the trial judge deter-
mined the unresolved charges 
relating to Chenault were barred 
by double jeopardy, the court 
ruled that the State could retry 
Butler on the charges concern-
ing the assault on Hudson. In a 
thorough analysis of the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel, the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the decision 
of the trial court. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
Butler's writ of certiorari to de-
termine if collateral estoppel 
barred the State from retrying 
Butler and affirmed the decision 
of the court of special appeals. 
The court of appeals 
began its discussion with an 
analysis ofthe principles ofdou-
ble jeopardy and collateral es-
toppel. First, the court noted 
that the double jeopardy prohi-
bition of the Fifth Amendment 
is applicable to the states as part 
of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But-
ler, 335Md. at 252, 643 A.2dat 
396 (citation omitted). The 
court further stated that the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel is 
embodied within the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee against 
double jeopardy and, as such, is 
an established component of 
Maryland's common law. Id. at 
253,643 A.2d at 396 (citations 
omitted). 
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In short, the court indi-
cated that when an issue ofulti-
mate fact has once been deter-
mined by a valid and final judg-
ment, collateral estoppel bars 
the relitigation of the same is-
sues between the same parties in 
any future lawsuit. Id. (cita-
tions omitted). Moreover, the 
court explained that although 
collateral estoppel is usually in-
voked based upon a prior ac-
quittal, the critical consideration 
is whether an issue of ultimate 
fact has been previously deter-
mined in favor ofthe defendant. 
Id. (citations omitted). Finally, 
the court noted that the burden 
of proof remains on the party 
asserting estoppel to show that 
"the issue whose relitigation he 
seeks to foreclo,se was actually 
decided in the first proceeding." 
Id. at 254, 643 A.2d at 396 
(citations omitted). 
Applying the aforemen-
tioned principles to the instant 
case, the court of appeals flatly 
rejected Butler's contention that 
collateral estoppel precluded the 
State from retrying him on the 
counts pertaining to the attack 
on Hudson. Id. at 255, 643 
A.2d at 397. Specifically, the 
court emphasized that Butler's 
conviction of accessory after 
the fact for the murder of 
Chenault was not, as a matter of 
law, inconsistent with convic-
tions for aiding and abetting in 
the shooting of Hudson. Id. 
The court noted that Butler's 
case predated the abrogation of 
the common law rule that a de-
fendant could not legally be both 
an accessory after the fact and a 
principal to the same substan-
tive felony, and furtherreasoned 
that Butler was not charged with 
being an accessory after the fact 
in any of the counts relating to 
Hudson. Id. Thus, the court 
determined that Butler could not 
avoid retrial based on the old 
common law rule that accesso-
ries after the fact cannot also be 
principals in the same crime be-
cause the murder of Chenault 
and the assault with intent to 
murder Hudson were different 
felonies. Id. 
The court similarly re-
jected Butler's contention that 
an accessory after the fact con-
viction is factually inconsistent 
with a finding that he aided and 
abetted in the shooting of 
Hudson. Id. at 256,642 A.2d at 
397. The court stated that where 
a jury is not clearly instructed to 
the contrary, a person could be 
found factually guilty of being a 
principal in the second degree 
by aiding and abetting, as well 
as guilty of being an accessory 
after the fact. Id. Accordingly, 
a jury could reasonably have 
found that Butler drove 
Tilghman from the murder scene 
and plotted with Tilghman to 
commit the crimes for which he 
was later charged. Id. at 257, 
643 Md. at 398. 
Additionally, the court 
rejected Butler's implication of 
the doctrine of mutual exclusiv-
ity. In further support of his 
collateral estoppel challenge, 
Butler argued that because of 
mutual exclusivity, collateral 
estoppel can be predicated upon 
a guilty verdict as to one crime, 
which, in tum, operates as a not 
guilty verdict as to another 
crime. Disregarding this argu-
ment, the court noted that al-
though collateral estoppel 
barred the State from convict-
ing Butler as an accessory after 
the fact to Chenault's murder 
and the legally inconsistent crime 
of being an aider and abettor to 
the same murder, the State was 
not barred from retrying Butler 
for the "legally consistent" 
crime of aiding and abetting in 
the shooting of Hudson. Id. at 
259, 643 A.2d at 399. 
The court concluded 
that although the jury acquitted 
Butler of second degree murder 
of Chenault, it did not necessar-
ily find that Butler had no intent 
to kill Hudson. Id. at 271,643 
A.2d at 405. The court stated 
that it was possible that the jury 
found Tilghman's shooting of 
Chenault was clearly first de-
gree premeditated murder and 
deadlocked on whether Butler 
aided and abetted in that mur-
der. Id. Accepting the trial 
judge's instruction that second 
degree murder does not involve 
premeditation or deliberation 
and his instruction that each 
count must be weighed sepa-
rately, the court of appeals held 
that Chenault's acquittal for sec-
ond degree murder was not in-
consistent with a determination 
that there was a premeditated 
and deliberate plan to kill 
Hudson. Id. Furthermore, the 
court determined that the jury 
neither found that Butler know-
ingly participated in that plan, 
nor found that he was an inno-
cent participant. Id. In light of 
the jury's determination that 
Butler was not a principal in any 
of the crimes for which he was 
charged, the court held that the 
State was free to retry him on the 
counts relating to the assault on 
Hudson. 
In holding that the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel will 
not bar retrial of unresolved is-
sues, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland articulated that where 
a trial involves the same crime 
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but different victims, a defen-
dant may ultimately be convict-
ed of being both an accessory 
after the fact as to one victim, 
and a principal as to another 
victim. This unjust and unduly 
restrictive holding indicates that 
if a defendant's conduct as to 
two victims is identical, the de-
fendant may nevertheless be re-
tried because one victim died 
and one survived. While defen-
dants already carry the onerous 
burden of proving that the ju-
ry's verdict in the first trial pre-
cludes relitigation of a particu-
lar factual issue in a second trial, 
this case severely limits the avail-
ability of collateral estoppel in 
criminal prosecutions. 
- Kimberly C. Foreman 
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